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"MILITARY DUE PROCESS": WHAT IS IT?
SEYMOUR W. WURFEL*

A LABEL oR CATCH PHRASE
On November 27, 1951, the United States Court of Military Appeals,
then some five months old, fashioned in the Clay case' what is characterized as a label. It embellished this label with quotation marks at
least twice in the course of the opinion. This label, which was, in the
language of the Court, used "for lack of a more descriptive phrase,"
was "military due process." This, and later use of the term by the
Court in other opinions, 2 has caused some students of military law to
speculate as to whether there is occurring the emergence of a new
doctrine of law. Others incline to the view that old wine is being purveyed in a new bottle. The opinions of the Court up to now seem to
indicate a trend to consider the term as alternative nomenclature for
the process of finding and declaring reversible error.
The words "due process" are perhaps the outstanding contribution
of the law to the dialectics of Alice in Wonderland. Fundamental,
solid and useful though the general doctrine of due process is, the civil
courts have repeatedly adverted to the difficulty encountered in endeavoring to define it. 3 Of the innumerable attempts to do so 4 perhaps
one of the best so far as criminal law is concerned is that of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which declared:
I.

"Due process of law in a criminal proceeding has been defined as consisting of 'a law creating or defining the offense, an impartial tribunal of
competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to
defend, trial according to established procedure, and discharge unless
found guilty."' 5
*Colonel, J.A.G.C.; member, California Bar; formerly: Chairman of a Board
of Review; Chief, Litigation Division, Office of Judge Advocate General of the
Army; Staff Judge Advocate, Philippine-Ryukyus Command. This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not necessarily express the
views of the Office of Judge Advocate General of the Army nor of any other
government instrumentality.
1. United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CMR 74, 77 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
2. United States v. Welch (No. 196), 3 CMR 136 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), discussed
in Sec. III infra.; United States v. Bartholomew (No. 166), 3 CMR 41
(U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United States v. Carter (No. 159), 2 CMR 14 (U.S.C.M.A.
1952); United States v. Davis (No. 29), 2 CMR 8 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
3. Ex parte MacDonald, 76 Ala. 603 (1884); Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58, 62, 63
(1880); People v. Tilkin, 13 Cal.2d 89, 90 P.2d 148, 152 (1939); Gilmer v. Bird,
15 Fla. 410, 421 (1875); Hodge v. Muscatine County, 121 Iowa 482, 96 N.W. 968,
971 (1903); Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315, 317 (1890); In re
Fuller's Estate, 34 Misc. 752, 70 N.Y. Supp. 1050, 1051 (Surr. Ct. 1901); Stuart
v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 191 (1878); Jones v. Franklin County, 130 N.C. 451, 42
S.E. 144, 149 (1902); Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 377, 403 (1872); Gaffney v.
Jones, 44 Wash. 158, 87 Pac. 114, 116 (1906); State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 415,
32 S.E. 283, 284 (1898).
4. See case excerpts collected in 13 WORDS AND PHRASES 488-593, 105-61.
5. Simons v. United States, 119 F.2d 539 at 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 616 (1941).
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Speaking through Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court has said, "that
what is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with
the subject matter and the necessities of the situation."'
Fortunately, our inquiry here need not extend over the entire scope
of due process. It is limited not only to criminal proceedings, but has
been drastically confined by definition by the United States Supreme
Court which has said, "To those in the military or naval service of the
7
United States the military law is due process."
The addition by the Court of Military Appeals of the adjective "military" to the words due process does not necessarily bring their thought
content into sharp focus. Whether "military due process" is simply
the violation label which the Court will paste upon any error which it
has already determined "materially prejudices the substantial rights
of the accused,"'8 or whether the words possess in their own right
some separate specific significance, is an open question which should be
put at rest. Some of the considerations involved are presented in this
article.

II. DOES THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS NEED A
"MILITARY DUE PROCESS" CONCEPT TO DISPATCH ITS BUSINESS?
With rare exceptions 9 the business of the United States Court of
Military Appeals is to examine records of trial in court-martial cases
6. In Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 82, 84, 86, 29 Sup. Ct. 235, 53 L. Ed. 410
(1909), the Supreme Court declared: "This is an action brought by the plaintiff
in error against the former governor of the State of Colorado, the former
adjutant general of the national guard of the same state and a captain of a
company of the national guard, for an imprisonment of the plaintiff by them
while in office ...
"The complaint alleges that the imprisonment was continued from the morning of March 30, 1904, to the afternoon of June 15, and that the defendants
justified under the Constitution of Colorado, making the governor commander
in chief of the state forces, and giving him power to call them out to execute
laws, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion. It alleges that his imprisonment was without probable cause....
"In such a situation we must assume that he had a right, under the state
constitution and laws, to call out troops, as was held by the supreme court of
the state. The constitution is supplemented by an act providing that 'when an
invasion of or insurrection in the state is made or threatened, the governor
shall order the national guard to repel or suppress the same.' Laws of 1897,
chap. 63, art. 7, sec. 2, p. 204. That means that he shall make the ordinary use
of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course,
that he may use the milder measure of seizing the body of those whom he
considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily
(85) for punishment, but are by way of precaution, to prevent the exercise of
hostile power....
. . . the plaintiff's position is that he has been deprived of his liberty
without due process of law. But it is familiar that what is due process of law
depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and the necessities
of the situation. Thus, summary proceedings suffice for taxes, and executive
decisions for exclusion from the country. ...
" .. the declaration does not disclose a 'suit authorized by law to be brought
to redress the deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution of the
United States."'
7. Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304, 31 Sup. Ct. 230, 55 L. Ed. 225 (1911).
8. 50 U.S.C.A. § 646 (1951).
9. Such exceptions normally deal with appellate powers. Representative are
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to determine whether they contain reversible error which has not
been corrected by action of the convening authority or by a board of
review.10 While the factual situations and legal problems thus presented are widely varied and highly complex the cases as ultimately
resolved by the Court fall into five classifications. These are: First,
cases in which there is no error except for the absence of substantial
evidence to support the findings; Second, cases supported by substantial
evidence in which there is no error present; Third, cases supported by
substantial evidence in which error is present but is found by the Court
to be not materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused;
Fourth, cases supported by substantial evidence in which error is
present and is found by the Court to be materially prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused; and Fifth, cases in which the courtmartial was without jurisdiction. Cases determined to be in classification two or three must be affirmed, those determined to be in classification one or five must be resolved in favor of the accused," and those
determined to be in classification four must be reversed and either
remanded for further appropriate proceedings or dismissed.' 2 Conceivably situations one, four and five could all exist in a single case.
the cases of United States v. Martin (No. 51), 1 CMR 82 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951), and
United States v. Sonnenschein (No. 8), 1 CMR 64 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951), in which
the Court declared itself to be without jurisdiction to entertain the appeals since
the Judicial Council had undertaken their appellate determination prior to
May 31, 1951, the effective date of the creation of the Court. In United States
v. Reeves (No. 453), 3 CMR 122, 126 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), it was held that "a
board of review has the authority, when the application (for reconsideration) is
not made by The Judge Advocate General, to reconsider its decision prior to
the time a petition for review has been served and filed by an accused, or a
certificate by a Judge Advocate General has been filed, or a record of trial
in a case involving an automatic appeal has reached this Court." In United
States v. Keith (No. 226), 4 CMR 34 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), where it was necessary
to reverse one of two convictions for different offenses and the original sentence
imposed was still within the authorized limit for the single offense approved,
the Court held it had no authority to determine as a matter of fact the appropriateness of the sentence and remanded the case to the board of review
to make this determination. The same technique was used in United States v.
Shepard (No. 343), 4 CMR 79 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).

10. 50 U.S.C.A. § 654 (1951).

11.50 U. S. C. A. § 654 (1951).
12. 50 U.S.C.A. § 654 (1951). In United States v. James (No. 551), 3 CMR 113
(U.S.C.M.A. 1952), the accused pleaded guilty to failure to obey a lawful order
and not guilty to petty theft, was found guilty of both; the finding as to failure
to obey was disapproved by the reviewing authority. The Navy Board of Review affirmed without opinion, noting that accused had pleaded guilty to the

charge of theft. This moved the Court to take the Navy Board of Review to task

in these words, '"We are unable to understand this action. The record is perfectly clear that petitioner pleaded not guilty to this charge. There is little
excuse for such obvious errors on the part of an appellate reviewing agency
where the liberty and reputation of one convicted of a serious crime is at
stake." This, and a failure of the president of the special court-martial to instruct on the elements of the offense to which the accused pleaded not guilty,
so disturbed the Court that it not only reversed but, exercising its prerogative
under Art. 67 (e), 50 U.S.C.A. § 654 (1951), dismissed the charge, thus returning
to the Navy immune from prosecution a person prima facie guilty of theft. In

United States v. Perna (No. 684), 4 CMR 30 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), also a theft

case, the Court goaded by at least five different substantially prejudicial errors
committed by a Navy special court-martial simply dismissed the charges
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A.
The number of cases reaching the Court which fall into the first
group in which the only vice is insufficiency of the evidence is small.
Typical of these are United States v. O'Nea1'3 and United States v.
Shull,14 both decided by a divided Court. In the former Air Force case
the evidence was found insufficient to sustain a finding of guilty under
Article of War 9415 of making a false writing in furtherance of a claim
against the United States. In the latter Army case the evidence was
found insufficient to sustain a finding of guilty under Article of War 5810
of absence without leave with intention to shirk important service. In
each case Judge Latimer felt the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
findings. These cases_ present no classification problem. The Court has
not discussed due process in these opinions and it seems clear that the
familiar doctrine of insufficiency of the evidence is alone adequate
for their determination without resort to due process considerations.
B.

The second group of cases, supported by substantial evidence and in
which the Court finds no error, is a large one. It embraces two principal situations. In one of these the sole question is the sufficiency of
the evidence. The court has experienced considerable difficulty in determining its position as to its powers and limitations in reviewing
evidence for sufficiency. Its first pronouncement on the subject was in
the McCrary case in which Judge Latimer in the majority opinion of a
divided Court found the evidence sufficient and held:
.....

if there is any substantial evidence in the record to support a convic-

tion an appellate court... will not set aside the verdict....

In stating

this rule we have not overlooked the converse principle that where there
is no substantial evidence in the record to sustain the conviction the appellate court will set it aside .... [However], this [second] rule neither
precludes those tribunals from drawing reasonable inferences from the
evidence presented nor does it permit this court to set aside a conviction
because we might have inferred differently."17
saying, at page 31, "The numerous errors committed . . .render undesirable
any further proceedings." It would indeed be most unfortunate if the Court
should make it a practice to vent its exasperation at the legal inaptitude of
some court-martial personnel by returning suspect thieves to the services
cloaked with immunity. Such is not the practice of the federal courts where
error, even in flagrant form, is dealt with dispassionately and with due regard
for the rights of the Government as well as those of the accused.
13. (No. 25), 2 CMR 44 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). This case raises the important and
interesting question of the quantum of evidence required by the Court to restrain it from reversing for insufficient evidence. Followed in United States v.
Horst (No. 822), 4 CMR 44 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), where conviction for cowardly
conduct in the presence of the enemy was reversed for lack of evidence of
cowardice.
14. (No. 45), 2 CIVIR 83 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).

15. 41
16. 41

STAT.
STAT.

805 (1920).
800 (1920).

17. United States v. McCrary (No. 4), 1 CMR 1, 3-4 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951). Followed in United States v. Goodman (No. 16), 2 CMR 76 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
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Judge Brosman concurred in this opinion but three months later apparently shifted his view and, writing for the changed majority in the
O'Neal case, said, "we need not reverse unless we believe that reasonable men would be in accord in holding that a rational hypothesis
other than that of guilt may be drawn from the evidence."1 8 In a strong
dissent Judge Latimer adhered to the position taken in the McCrary
case.19 A few days later in the Shull case Judge Brosman, again representing the majority of a divided court, wrote:
"1... it is clearly allowable that we weigh the evidence for the limited

purpose of testing for substance and determining the reasonableness as a
matter of law of inferences drawn by the fact-finders ....

This action

[setting aside the finding as based on insufficient evidence] is predicated
on the position that the evidence before the court-martial did not permit a
determination of the possession of such an intent on the part of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt and within the fair operation of reasonable
20

minds."

Judge Latimer again dissented. Less than a month later the Court
achieved judicial harmony on this issue in the Jacobs case by saying:
".... we find adequate evidence -the 'substantial evidence' regarded by
us as necessary -to support the court-martial's conclusion that petitioner
intended to and did in fact participate in the felony here charged. See
United States v. McCrary,
U.S.C.M.A.
, decided November
8, 1951; United States v. O'Neal, U.S.C.M.A .
., decided February 7, 1952; United States v. Shul,
U.S.C.LA.
, decided
February 18, 1952. In the first of these cited cases the following language
was used, which is here repeated with approval: [The Court then repeated
the exact language from the McCrary case, quoted above.]" 2 1

This bears all the earmarks of a sub silentio strategic retreat from the
O'Neal case. A month later however in upholding a Navy desertion

case the Court through Judge Brosman was still citing the O'Neal case:
"Our inquiry, then, becomes one of whether the complex of evidence in
this case permitted a determination, beyond a reasonable doubt and within
18. United States v. O'Neal (No. 25), 2 CAR 44, 54 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
19. In United States v. O'Neal (No. 25), 2 CIVIR 54, 55 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952),
Judge Latimer, in dissent, wrote: "In view of the fact that I believe the opinion
of the Court announces a rule which permits us to invade the province of the
court-martial and weigh the evidence to arrive at a result, or function which
Congress specifically denied us, I am compelled to dissent. . .

."

And at page

57, "if we held that we can weigh the evidence on scales tilted in favor of the
accused then we become the third fact-finding body in the military justice
system and legislate into ourselves powers which a fully informed Congress
specifically refused to grant." The reference here is to the last sentence of
Art. 67(d) of the Code, 50 U.S.C.A. § 654 (1951), which provides, "The Court
of Military Appeals shall take action only with respect to matters of law." The
view expressed by Judge Latimer appears to possess superior merit.
20. United States v. Shull (No. 45), 2 CMR 83, 86, 89 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
21. United States v. Jacobs (No. 152), 2 ChR 115, 118 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
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the fair operation of reasonable minds, that the accused, at the inception of,
or at some time during his unauthorized absence, possessed the intention
permanently to abandon the naval service. See United States v. O'Neal,
U.S.C.M.A.., decided February 7, 1952; United States v.
Shull,
.U.S.C.M.A .
, decided February 18, 1952; United
States v. Peterson, supra. We are convinced that it did."22

Judge Latimer pointedly concurred in the result only. Then less than
a week later a reconciled and unanimous Court speaking through

Judge Latimer in an involuntary manslaughter case opined:
"We are satisfied that any fair minded person could conclude the accused
was guilty of culpable negligence and . . .there was sufficient evidence
before the court to permit the members to find his conduct was reckless and
in wanton disregard of the rights of the deceased." 23

No attempt was made to define the required quantum of evidence, but
after a careful review of the facts the Court simply stated its ultimate
conclusion that the evidence was sufficient. Finally in a murder case
we have a unanimous court declaring:
"It is familiar learning that the guilt of an accused person may be established through circumstantial evidence. It is also recognized that the
jurisdiction of this Court extends only to matters of law. See Uniform
Code of Military Justice, Article 67(d), 50 U.S.C., Sec. 654. Our task,
therefore, is to determine whether the findings of guilty in the case at bar
. .are based on some substantial evidence, as that term has been interpreted by us in previous decisions. We entertain no doubt that they are so
based under the test applied in such cases as United States v. McCrary,
U.S.C.M.A.,
decided November 8, 1951, and United States
v. O'Neal,
U.S.C.M.A.
r decided February 7, 1952. We are
quite unwilling to disturb the findings in the present case." 24

This magical and belated twinning of the McCrary and O'Neal cases
Is possibly an invitation to the military practitioner to take his choice
or perhaps a caveat that things have changed and that the talisman has
now become "some substantial evidence." This latter test has been
applied in holding the evidence sufficient to support a conviction of a
civilian employee in Japan for conduct bringing discredit upon the
military service,5 and to support a conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon. 26 That this issue is still in foment is indicated by the
fact that in June, 1952, a bill was introduced in the House of Represen22. United States v. Ferretti (No. 213), 3 CMR 57, 59 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
See also United States v. Peterson (No. 199), 3 CMR 51 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
23. United States v. Riggleman (No. 195), 3 CMR 70. 75 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
24. United States v. Jarvis (No. 94), 3 CMR 102, 105 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
25. United States v. Marker (No. 281), 3 CMR 127 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
26. United States v. Norton (No. 98), 4 CMR 3 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). In United
States v. Sperland (No. 366), 3 Sept. 1952 (U.S.C.M.A.), the evidence was held
sufficient to sustain a conviction of misbehavior before the enemy by running
away.

1953]

MILITARY DUE PROCESS

tatives to change Article 67 (d) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

to read:
"In any case reviewed by it, the Court of Military Appeals shall have
authority to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and
of fact, recognizing that the trial court
determine controverted questions
27
saw and heard the witnesses."
Should this become law the Court, within its sphere, will exercise
powers not possessed by the Supreme Court of the United States nor
other appellate tribunals. The significant fact for our present inquiry
is that in none of these cases raising the sufficiency of the evidence has
the Court felt any question of due process is involved. Nor has the
Court used the term due process in any of these opinions, heavily laden
with legal travail though they are.
The other cases falling in group two as being supported by substantial evidence and without error, are usually those in which the issue of
the admissibility of a confession has been raised and determined adversely to the accused. In the Monge larceny case the Court held admissible a second voluntary confession given eleven hours after a first
involuntary statement had been forcibly taken from the accused without warning him of his right against self-incrimination. 28 The court
said:
"If the fact-finders could reasonably conclude that the confession was
voluntary, then we must affirm.... The question remains one of fact....
The relationship between the earlier and later confession is not so close that
we must say the facts of the former control the character of the latter."29
Appellant further contended that failure to warn him at the time of
the second statement that any prior involuntary confession could not
be used against him itself required exclusion of the latter statement.
The Court in rejecting this contention declared:
"Congress has specifically required that an accused, before being questioned, must be warned of his right to say nothing and of the fact that
anything he says may be used against him at trial. The effect of the defense
argument is to require an additional warning, not provided by Congress.
We are not disposed to add judicially to the warning deemed adequate
by Congress unless there are impelling reasons for so doing. We find none
here.... While the presence of a warning such as contended for by de27. H.R. 8395 reported in JAG Chronicle No. 29, page 125, July 18, 1952. This
proposed wording, from "shall" on, is taken verbatim from Art. 66(c) of the
Uniform Code which vested this power in boards of review. Congress not only
has not conferred such power upon the Court, but in Art. 67 (d) expressly provided, "The Court of Military Appeals shall take action only with respect to
matters of law."
28. United States v. Monge (No. 9), 2 CAMR 1 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
29. Id. at 4-6.
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fense may well be a factor in deciding that subsequent confessions are,
in fact, voluntary, and while we may feel that such a warning is desirable,
we cannot conclude that its absence must result in exclusion of a confession." 30

In the Sapp larceny case the court held proper the admission of a
second voluntary confession which followed by only four hours a first
31
confession of another offense which had been obtained by coercion.
In the Creamercase, after finding the record contained substantial independent evidence of the corpus delicti of the offense of absence without leave, the Court in these words held a spontaneous confession admissible:
"It is urged that the original declaration was involuntary because made
to a uniformed air policeman, who identified himself as such, and who
had not at the time warned the accused of his rights [against self-

incrimination] under Article of War 24, supra. We are not impressed by
these arguments. The testimony of Corporal Lewis that the accused's
initial remark was volunteered and unsolicited was ... wholly uncontradicted.... Thus we are required to ask whether an unrequested disclosure
freely made during the course of a friendly and aimless conversation by
an accused person to one of the same military grade is necessarily inthe latter is a member
admissible as involuntary by virtue of the fact that
32
of the military police. We think that it is not."

The Court takes the position that if "the accused fairly possessed, at the
time of the confession, 'mental freedom' to confess or to deny participa-

tion in the crime charged," 33 then the confession is admissible. No resort to the language of "due process" has been made by the court in
determining confession admissibility cases nor does the application of
legal principles other than the normal rules of evidence appear to be
required.
C.
The third category of cases in which error is present but is found
to be "harmless" is a wide one. Not all error necessitates reversal.
Congress has expressly provided that, "A finding or sentence of a courtmartial shall not be held incorrect on the ground of an error of law
unless the error materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused2'3 The Court painstakingly applies this rule to each error which
30. Id. at 6.

31. United States v. Sapp (No. 14), 2 CMR 6 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
32. United States v. Creamer (No. 179), 3 CMR 1, 7 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).

33. United States v. Webb (No. 370), 2 CMR 125, 128 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). In
this larcency case it was held that a statement made by the investigating agent
in the same conversation in which the accused confessed, but afterwards, to the
effect that another person who had confessed had received a relatively light
sentence, did not make the confession inadmissible.

34. 50 U.S.C.A. § 646 (1951).

19531
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is paraded before it. In a given case if no error is found to be "materially prejudicial" it is affirmed, but if any one error is considered
to be "materially prejudicial" to the substantial rights of the accused
it is reversed and normally remanded for further proceedings. By way
of definition the Court has said, "'Substantial rights' means not seeming or imaginary, not illusive, but real, solid and firm rights."3 5 The
following imposing array of situations has already been declared by
the Court to constitute error but not materially prejudicial error:
1. The charges were not sworn to as required by Article 30 (a) of
the Uniform Code. 36
2. The admission of hearsay evidence, where apart from the hearsay there is ample evidence to support the conviction. 37
3. The failure of the president of a special court-martial, after a
plea of guilty, to instruct the court as to the elements of the offense and
failure to vote upon the findings as distinguished from the sentence. 38
4. The attempt of trial counsel in an embezzlement case to elicit
from a government witness testimony concerning a separate offense of
absence without leave committed by the accused, to which objection
39
was sustained.
35. United States v. Lucas (No. 7), 1 CMR 19, 23 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
36. United States v. May (No. 241), 2 CMR 80 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
37. United States v. Doyle (No. 265), 4 CMR 137, 142 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952);
United States v. Flores (No. 75), 1 CAR 42 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951); United States
v. Isbell (No. 21), 2 CMR 37 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). In the latter case at page 43,
the Court stated: "We would not permit a finding to stand if it were based
solely on hearsay evidence, but when, as here, each finding is based on substantial evidence and at the best the hearsay is either repetitious of the competent evidence, bolstered by cross-examination, fortified in part by defense
testimony, or admissible as in exception to the hearsay rule, we cannot say
that it prejudiced the defendant within the meaning of Article 59, Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 50 USCA Sec. 646, which provides that the finding or
sentence of a court-martial shall not be held incorrect on the grounds of an
error of law unless the error materially prejudices the substantial rights of the
accused. We must place some burden on counsel for the accused to police the
record, know the issues, and object to incompetent evidence, unless they believe
it to be beneficial. If it can be considered as either favorable or unfavorable and
a gamble is taken on its effect, then the accused must accept the consequences."
For a case in which the admission of hearsay was held to be prejudicial error
see United States v. Kellum (No. 408), 4 CMR 74 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
38. See also United States v. Jones (No. 426), 3 CMR 10 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952);
United States v. Lucas (No. 7), 1 CMR 19 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951); United States v.
O'Brassill (No. 52), 1 CMR 27 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951); United States v. Bishop (No.
37), 1 CMR 29 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951); United States v. Goodrich (No. 36), 1 CIVIR
26 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951). These were all Navy cases. In the Lucas case, at page
24, the court astutely observed, "An accused is not presumed innocent after he
has pleaded guilty."
39. United States v. Valencia (No. 308), 4 CMR 7 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). The
Court said: "Trial counsel is entitled to try a case as he sees it, and it would
be ridiculous to argue that he is guilty of misconduct in every instance where
an offer of evidence or the answer to a question in [sic] excluded by the law
officer. Mistakes of judgment as to the law often occur, and such mistakes
do not show an intention to deliberately flout established law in order to persuade the court to convict. The test to be applied must, therefore, have two
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5. In a case controlled by the law effective before the Uniform Code
of Military Justice in which the accused pleaded guilty where neither
trial counsel nor defense counsel were admitted to practice law, the
fact that trial counsel held a law degree and defense counsel did not.40
6. The appointment of a noncommissioned warrant officer to serve
as trial counsel of a Navy special court-martial in which the accused
41
pleaded guilty.
7: The appointment of a noncommissioned warrant gunner as assistant defense counsel in a Navy special court-martial case in which
the accused pleaded guilty and in which the assistant defense counsel
did not participate. 42
8. Where the evidence clearly established intent to avoid hazardous
service rather than ordinary desertion, and the accused was charged
with desertion with intent to avoid hazardous service, the giving of
an instruction regarding intent to remain away permanently which is
43
not an element of the offense charged.
9. The admission in evidence of a confession not affirmatively
shown to be voluntary."
branches. First, does the conduct indicate an intent to deliberately disregard
the rules of evidence in order to influence the court, and, second, could the
improper remarks have reasonably affected the court's deliberations on the
findings and sentence? Or, to put it another way, we should reverse only for
prejudicial misconduct on the part of the trial counsel. A mere error of judgment will not reach the level of misconduct; the erroneous statement or question may be such as to carry no prejudicial effect; and even if both of these
tests are satisfied, there may be convincing evidence of guilt, which would also
negate the effect of prejudice." 4 CMR at 10.
40. United States v. Phillips (No. 161), 3 CAR 50 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
41. United States v. Goodson (No. 424), 3 CMR 32 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
42. United States v. Hutchison (No. 425), 3 CMR 25 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
43. United States v. Moynihan (No. 278), 3 CMR 67 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952);
United States v. Jenkins (No. 238), 3 CMR 63 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). See also
United States v. Boone (No. 320), 3 CMR 115 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), in which the
accused was charged with and found guilty of ordinary desertion and the court
held the giving of instructions which also covered desertion to avoid hazardous
duty and to shirk important service, was, under the evidence of that case,
nonprejudicial error. At page 119, the Court said: "Because of the lack of
evidence to support an inference of intent to shirk important service or avoid
hazardous duty and the preponderance of evidence upon which to base an inference of intent to abandon the service, we believe this case falls within the
rule announced in United States v. Jenkins, supra, and United States v.
Moynihan, supra."
44. United States v. Doyle (No. 265), 4 CMR 137 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). The
Court stated: "We are not here called upon to decide whether the improper
reception in evidence of an involuntary confession will vitiate the proceedings
regardless of other compelling evidence of guilt. Here, there is no indication
that the confession was actually involuntary. The policy considerations which
have led some courts to reverse convictions solely because of the use of involuntary confessions in evidence has no application here. We are aware of no
similar policy consideration which requires that a failure to follow the prescribed procedure in introducing confessions should be, per se, fatal to the
proceedings. In such a case, it is appropriate that we should be bound by the
rule which prohibits reversal for error unless it is substantially prejudicial to
the accused. Here, there is other and convincing proof of guilt." 4 CMR at 142.
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10. Where the accuser also served as trial counsel. 45
11. The imposing of a sentence reading, "to forfeit two-thirds pay
per month for two months" instead of in specific terms of dollars and
cents.

46

12. Failure to afford defense counsel a formal opportunity for inspection of service record entries of previous convictions before their
47
admission in evidence
The foregoing are representative examples of nonprejudicial error.
In at least one case the Court has held, by a two-to-one decision, that
prejudicial error committed by a court-martial in considering evidence
of a previous conviction which the law officer had erroneously excluded was purged by subsequent substantial reductions in the period
of confinement by both the convening authority and the board of review.48 The fact that the prior conviction in question was as a matter

of law properly admissible perhaps influenced the Court considerably
in this case.
The Court in its unanimous decision in the Jenkins case has well
stated its approach to the problem of error:
"Having determined that error is present, we are compelled to test the
record for prejudice as Congress has decreed that we shall not reverse a
finding of guilty for an error of law unless it prejudicially affects the substantial rights of petitioner. See Article 59 (a), Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 646. In each previous desertion case involving the
same error ininstructions we have analyzed the facts to determine whether
the impact of the error would in any way influence the court to the prejudice of the accused. Because in the previous cases the evidence on each
type of intent was substantial and almost in equipoise, we concluded it
was probable that reasonable men might be led to render a finding on an
element of intent not framed by the specification and that a fair risk of
substantial prejudice was present. In this instance, we arrive at a contrary
conclusion.
'Wile we desire to protect adequately the rights of an accused, we can
not found prejudice on every inaccuracy in instructions. Technical errors
and minor irregularities will creep into the trial of law suits and appellate
courts can not administer justice fairly by failing to appreciate that the
trial of criminal cases is a practical business, which can not be carried
on with perfection. The best we can do is to place our stamp of disapproval
45. In United States v. Lee (No. 200), 2 CMR 118, 124 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952),
the Court ruled, "The inquiry conducted by the accuser here did not constitute
him an investigating officer and thus disqualified him."
46. United States v. Gilgallon (No. 286), 2 CMR 170 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). The
Court here reversed a Navy Board of Review.
47. United States v. Castillo (No. 449), 3 CIVIR 86 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). In
reversing a Navy Board of Review the Court said, at page 91, "At most a
procedural irregularity transpired, which could have been rectified immediately
upon application."
48. United States v. Jones (No. 79), 3 CVIR 36 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
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on the error and then affirm only those cases where the irregularity does
49
not touch the merits of the findings."

Another illuminating statement of the Court's thinking on this point
is found in the Lee case:
"It is clear, however, that Article 59 (a), as well as other similar Federal
and State legislation, grew out of a widespread and deep conviction concerning the general course of review in American criminal cases, and the
fear that our appellate courts in criminal cases had become in truth 'impregnable citadels of technicality.' See Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 759-760, notes 11-14. The object of 'harmless error' legislation,
we are told by Mr. Justice Rutledge in the Kotteakos case supra, is: 'To
substitute judgment for automatic application of rules; to preserve review
as a check upon arbitrary action and essential unfairness in trials, but at
the same time to make the process perform that function without giving
men fairly convicted the multiplicity of loopholes which any highly rigid
and minutely detailed scheme of errors, especially in relation to procedure,
will engender and reflect in a printed record' [p. 760]."50

The Court has served notice on counsel that timely objection must
be made to the admission of evidence. In the Masusock case it said:
"... before this court will review an assignment of error based on the inadmissibility of evidence, where it clearly appears that the defense understood its right to object, except in those instances of manifest miscarriage
of justice, there must be an appropriate objection or protest lodged before
the trial court so that the court and opposing counsel will be put on notice
that the admissibility is in dispute. Otherwise we will consider the objection waived. See paragraph 154d, Manual for Courts-Martial 1951. It
should be apparent that to hold otherwise would result in an inefficient
appellate system, interminable delays in the final disposition of cases, and
careless trial representation." 51

D.
In transition from group three to group four in this analysis of the
business of the Court it may be appropriate to observe that error as it
comes to the Court is initially a single undifferentiated pool. Not so
limpid perhaps as that located in Yellowstone Park balanced on the
continental divide, but akin to it in that from the single bosom of the
latter one part flows to the Pacific and the other to the Mississippi,
while from the error pool the Court directs one stream through the
nonprejudicial or harmless channel to the sea of Affirmed and the
other through the prejudicial channel to the sea of Reversed.
Among errors which the Court has found to be prejudicial are the
following:
49. United States v. Jenkins (No. 238), 3 CMR 63, 65, 66 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
50. United States v. Lee (No. 200), 2 CMR 118, 122 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
51. United States v. Masusock (No. 15), 1 CMR 32,34 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
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1. Failure to put in evidence the record of two previous convictions

where such previous convictions are essential to the validity of the
sentence 2imposed. "That an excessive sentence is prejudicial is ap5
parent.1
2. The refusal of the law officer in a rape case to grant the accused
a continuance to obtain another witness, an interpreter, requested because of asserted surprise resulting from the exclusion of certain hearfrom a
say evidence regarding fresh complaint sought to be elicited
53
witness who received the complaint through the interpreter.
3. The exclusion of a dying declaration offered in evidence in be-

54
half of the accused in a murder case.

4. The admission in evidence in a sodomy case of testimony by the
victim's mother as to the details told to her shortly after the event by
the four-year-old twin brother of the victim. With this evidence excluded it was then prejudicial error to admit the accused's confession
since no valid evidence remained tending to establish the corpus
delicti.55

5. The proof before findings of prior offenses entirely unrelated to
the offenses charged, and reference to other offenses not charged.56
6. Where the accused had burglarized the residence of two general
officers, for one general to act as convening and reviewing authority in
the case 7 based upon the burglarly of the residence of the other
5
general.
7. The failure of the president of a Navy special court-martial to
52. United States v. Townsend (No. 597), June 23, 1952, 4 CAR 33
(U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United States v. Deweese (No. 633), 3 CMR 134
(U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United States v. Pruchniewski (No. 489), 3 CMR 62
(U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United States v. Hand (No. 450) 3 CMR 35 (U.S.C.M.A.
1952); United States v. Adams (No. 452), 3 CMR 9 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United
States v. Schabel (No. 440), 3 CMR 9 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United States v.
Trimiar (No. 413), 2 CMR 169 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United States v. Zimmerman
(No. 261), 2 CAR 66 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United States v. Carter (No. 159), 2
CMR 14, 20 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). These are all Navy cases.
53. United States v. Plummer (No. 235), 3 CMR 107 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
Judge Latimer dissenting, said at page 113, "I would not scrutinize diligence
so closely if the record showed substantial prejudice to the accused, but it does
not. Prejudice ties in with the factor that accused must show the evidence
was necessary for a just determination of the cause. The burden to establish
both is on accused."
54. United States v. De Carlo (No. 32), 1 CMR 90 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
55. United States v. Mounts (No. 73), 2 CMR 20 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
56. United States v. Yerger (No. 122), 3 CMR 22 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). The
Court reversed the Coast Guard Board of Review and returned the record to
the General Counsel for the Treasury Department for further proceedings.
57. United States v. Gordon (No. 258), 2 CMR 161 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). At
page 157 the Court stated, "the test should be whether the appointing authority
was so closely connected to the offense that a reasonable person would conclude
that he had a personal interest in the matter." The Court disposed of the case on
the ground of prejudicial error, rather than jurisdiction.
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instruct as to the presumption of innocence, burden of proof and the
elements of an offense to which the accused had pleaded not guilty.58
8. The failure to instruct as to the elements of a lesser included offense where the evidence tended to establish guilt of the lesser included
offense.5 9
9. The failure to instruct as to the elements of murder where accused was charged with the offense of assault with intent to commit
60
murder.
10. Where the accused, in Korea, was charged only with ordinary desertion, the giving of instructions which included the elements of
desertion to avoid hazardous duty and to shirk important service, in a
case where the evidence might have established any of the three of58. United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CVIR 74, 81 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951). Al-

though the square holding was that this failure to instruct was "error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused," this is the first
opinion in which the Court discussed military due process. This aspect of the
case will be considered later. The Clay case has been followed as to failure
to instruct in United States v. Shepard (No. 343), 4 CMR 79 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952),
and United States v. Keith (No. 226), 4 CMR 34 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). In United
States v. Rhoden (No. 153), 2 CMR 99 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), the Court reversed
for prejudicial error where the instructions given adequately covered only the
elements of lesser included offenses and omitted necessary elements of the
greater offenses of which accused was both charged and convicted. No objection was interposed on behalf of the accused at the time of trial.
59. United States v. Williams (No. 251), 2 ChR 137 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). Accused was charged with assault with intent to commit murder and no instruction was given as to the elements of the offense of assault with a dangerous
weapon. Followed in United States v. Avery (No. 809), 4 CMR 125 (U.S.C.M.A.
1952), and United States v. Drew (No. 422), 4 C1R 63 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
Also United States v. Clark (No. 190), 2 CMIR 107 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), in which
the accused, charged with voluntary manslaughter, was found guilty of negligent homicide and no instruction was given as to the elements of negligent
homicide. Judge Quinn dissented, saying that the name of the crime of negligent
homicide supplies its own definition. The majority, at pages 111 and 112, said:
"Correct procedure under military law requires that, unless the evidence excludes any reasonable inference that a lesser crime was committed, the duty of
the law officer is to carve out instructions covering the offense. He is the judge
in the military system and he must furnish to the court the legal framework
of all offenses which the evidence tends to establish. Unless he does so the accused has been denied a right which we conclude was granted by Congress and
error as a matter of law follows." See, however, United States v. Ginn (No.
263), 4 CMR 45 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), where the accused was charged with premeditated murder but was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The evidence did not raise the issue of self-defense and no instruction on self-defense
was requested by defense counsel. The evidence supported the charge of murder
and not the finding of voluntary manslaughter. In this case it was held not error
not to have instructed on self-defense nor on the elements of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. See also, United States v. Quisenberry (No. 329), 9 Sept. 1952 (U.S.C.M.A., where the accused was charged with
and convicted of unpremeditated murder, and under the facts of the case the
absence of the instructions as to the elements of lesser included offenses was
held not to be error.
60. United States v. Williams (No. 251), 2 CMR 137, 141 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
See also United States v. Drew (No. 422), 4 CMR 63 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952), and
United States v. Banks (No. 382), 4 CIVIR 71 (U.S.C.M.A.).

1953]

MILITARY DUE PROCESS

fenses. This result was reached even though no objection was made
61
to the instruction at the trial.
The ratio decidendi of all these cases was the presence of error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused which
necessitated reversal.
E.
The fifth group of cases into which the business of the Court falls
are those in which attack is made upon the jurisdiction of the courtmartial. If jurisdiction is lacking the entire proceeding falls. The
question of jurisdiction may, of course, be raised at any stage of the
proceeding including appeal. Furthermore, jurisdiction is the sole aspect of a court-martial proceeding which may be considered in the
regular federal courts and this only by way of collateral attack in a
habeas corpus proceeding, 62 and then only after all military remedies
of appeal and motion for new trial have first been exhausted. 63 The
Supreme Court of the United States has succinctly stated court-martial
jurisdictional requisites in these words:
"The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.... In this case the courtmartial had jurisdiction of the person of accused and the offense charged,
and acted within its lawful powers. The correction of any errors it may
have committed is for the military authorities which are alone authorized
to review its decisions." 64
The question of whether the court-martial was duly constituted, i.e.,
"acted within its lawful powers," was before the Court in the following
five cases. In the Merritt case, 65 the accused was brought to trial on
June 6, 1951, before a summary court convened under the old Articles
for the Government of the Navy and not in accordance with the requirements for a special court-martial, its successor, as set forth in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice which became effective May 31,
61. United States v. R. L. Williams (No. 133), 2 CM 92 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
At page 94 the Court declared, "When a substantial right is denied we will not
speculate as to the extent of the damage done. . .

."

At page 95, the court said,

"We cannot emphasize too strongly the necessity of objection at the proper
time." To the same effect, on the instruction issue, see United States v. Justice
(No. 1106), 28 Aug. 1952 (U.S.C.M.A.; United States v. Shepard (No. 343),
4 CMR 79 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United States v. Goddard (No. 331), 4 CMR
67 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952); United States v. Hemp (No. 290), 3 CMR 14 (U.S.C.M.A.
1952).
62. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111, 70 Sup. Ct. 495, 94 L. Ed. 691 rehearing
denied, 339 U.S. 939 (1950); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23, 25 L. Ed. 538 (1879).
For a detailed discussion of military habeas corpus see Wurfel, Military Habeas
Corpus, 49 1!cir. L. REV. 493-528 & 699-722 (1951). Footnote 210 thereof, at
page 714, collects the Supreme Court authority on this point.
63. Gusick v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132-33, 71 Sup. Ct. 149, 95 L. Ed. 146
(1950).
64. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111, 70 Sup. Ct. 495, 94 L. Ed. 691, rehearing
denied, 339 U.S. 939 (1950).
65. United States v. Merritt (No. 53), 1 CMR 56, 63 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
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1951. The Court held the Naval summary court was without jurisdiction. This situation was peculiar to the change-over period and presumably will not arise again.
In the Emerson case,66 charges against the accused were referred for
trial by indorsement to Navy special court "A". The case was in fact
tried by special court "B", an entirely different court, convened however by the same convening authority. The Court held this procedural
irregularity in bringing the case before the special court-martial did
not divest it of jurisdiction.
In the Hutchison case,67 the Court held that where the appointed as-

sistant defense counsel of a Navy special court was a noncommissioned
warrant gunner and thus not an officer as defined by Article 1 (5) of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice,68 this did not operate to deprive
the Court of jurisdiction and that if it did constitute procedural error
it was harmless. 69 The question before the Court in the Goodson case70
was whether the appointment of a noncommissioned warrant officer
pay clerk, not an officer within the meaning of the Code, as trial counsel of a Navy special court-martial deprived it of jurisdiction. The
Court answered this in the negative.7 1
The two joint accused in the LaGrange case 72 were hospitalmen as66. United States v. Emerson (No. 77), 1 CMR 43 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
67. United States v. Hutchison (No. 425), 3 CMR 25 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
68. 50 U.S.C.A. § 551 (1951).
69. United States v. Hutchison (No. 425), 3 CMR 25 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). At
pages 26 and 27, the Court in reversing a Navy Board of Review held: "Congress has not ... conferred upon an accused an explicit and absolute right
to have any assistant defense counsel appointed, nor to have such counsel, if
appointed, be an officer. This case presents, therefore, no violation of a statutory
right. Congress has laid out in the Uniform Code of Military Justice the framework within which military courts-martial must function, and a court must
step outside that framework before it will lose jurisdiction already properly
acquired under the statute....

"'The 70th Article of War does not give the right of counsel to the person
under investigation. Hence no jurisdictional defect can be claimed under a
contention that a court-martial is not a court of general jurisdiction (Cf. Dynes
v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 80, 15 L. Ed. 838), but is a special proceeding requiring
that compliance with each step in its attaining its jurisdiction must be shown.'
"There is here no violation of a mandatory requirement of the Code, and
therefore no jurisdictional defect.... Even assuming that the appointment of
Warrant Officer Chew constituted error, we fail to see how this error in any
way harmed the accused."
70. United States v. Goodson (No. 424), 3 CMR 32 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
71. United States v. Goodson (No. 424), 3 CMR 32 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). At
pages 34 and 35, the Court said: "Congress did not intend to make otherwise
valid court-martial judgments wholly void merely because of a technical noncompliance with a provision of the Code which is not an 'indispensable prerequisite' to concepts of military justice and a fair trial.
"Even though the defect we are considering is not jurisdictional . . .error

was committed by the appointment of a noncommissioned warrant officer as
trial counsel. Paragraph 6 of the Manual prohibits this action. As we have
constantly reiterated, it is not every error which will cause reversal - prejudice
must be shown. It is difficult to see how an accused in any case could be harmed
by a noncommissioned warrant officer serving as counsel for the Government."
72. United States v. LaGrange and Clay (No. 313), 3 CMR 76 (U.S.C.M.A.
1952).
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signed to the USS Haven. The commander of this ship, a Navy captain,
personally formally accused them of violation of ship regulations in
misusing drugs and forwarded the charges to his superior, the Commander of Naval Forces, Far East, who in turn referred the charges
for trial to a naval base at Pusan, Korea, commanded by a Navy commander. The Court held under these circumstances that this special
court was without jurisdiction since an officer junior to the accuser and
one not in the normal chain of command did not have authority to appoint it. "Congress intended that if an officer authorized to convene a
court is disqualified, a superior must assume the responsibility and
convene the court."73 The jurisdictional question in all of these cases
was whether the court was duly constituted.
The issue of jurisdiction of the person was presented in the Marker
case,7 4 in which the accused was a GS-11 civilian employee of the Army
in Japan convicted under Article of War 96 of conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the military service by exacting substantial gifts
from Japanese employees subordinate to him. The Court held the accused was "accompanying or serving with the armies of the United
States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States" and so
subject to court-martial jurisdiction under Article of War 2 (d).75
Jurisdiction of the offenses was challenged in the Snyder case,7 6
where the accused marine contended that his actions in attempting
three times on a base to entice others to engage in intercourse with a
female and of bringing her into a barracks in violation of a general
order constituted no violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The Court held the former to be an offense under Article 13477 and the
latter an offense under Article 9278 and that each was supported by the
evidence.
The final facet of jurisdiction was before the Court in Carter79 and
its companion cases80 in which, due to erroneous consideration of prior
convictions not properly in evidence, sentences including bad-conduct
discharges were imposed where the court-martial only had jurisdiction
73. United States v. LaGrange and Clay (No. 313), 3 CMR 76, 79 (U.S.C.M.A.
1952).
74. United States v. Marker (No. 281), 3 CMR 127 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
75. 41 STAT. 787 (1920).
76. United States v. Snyder (No. 409), 4 CMR 15 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). Cited
with approval in United States v. Herndon (No. 570), 4 CMR 53 (U.S.C.M.A.
1952), where the Court held that a specification reading, "In that, George
H. Herndon, lieutenant, junior grade, U.S. Navy ...Yokosuka, Japan, did, at
said station, on or about 23 July 1951, unlawfully receive about two hundred
(200) pounds of coffee, of a value of about $140.00, the property of the United
States Government, which property, as he, the said Herndon, then well knew,
had been stolen ... ." stated a disorder and neglect to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in violation of Article 134, 50 U.S.C.A. § 728 (1951). See
also United States v. Wade (No. 586), 4 CMR 51 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
77. 50 U.S.C.A. § 728 (1951).
78. 50 U.S.C.A. § 686 (1951).
79. United States v. Carter (No. 159), 2 CMR 14 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
80. Collected in footnote 52, supra.
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to impose three days confinement and forfeiture of two-thirds pay for
a like period for each day of the short unauthorized absence with which
the accused were charged. As to that portion of a sentence imposed in
excess of the maximum authorized by law a court is without jurisdiction.81 In these cases the Court did not discuss lack of jurisdiction but
contented itself with finding that the erroneous consideration of the
prior convictions was prejudicial.
The preceding sampling of the business of the Court of Military Appeals is by no means exhaustive of the specific questions that have
arisen, and will hereafter arise, but it is broad enough to establish the
pattern made by the impact of that business. In this litigation the
Court did not find it necessary to resort to due process considerations
to reach a just result. The sturdy baskets labeled "insufficient evidence," "substantial evidence," "harmless error," "materially prejudicial error" and "with or without jurisdiction" served adequately to
carry off these cases to their proper destinations. The question remains, is a "military due process" basket required?

III. "ImiTARY DUE

PROCESS" AS DEFINED BY
THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

The case chosen by the Court for its initial excursion into the field
of due process was one in which a sailor named Clay was charged with
wearing an improper uniform and with disorder. 82 To the first charge
Clay pleaded guilty, to the second, not guilty. The president of the
special court-martial failed to instruct at all as to the elements of the
offense of disorder or as to the presumption of innocence or the burden
of proof. Conviction followed, which was affirmed by the board of review and reversed by the Court. The Court, very properly, expressly
found this failure to instruct constituted error materially prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused. 83 Having done so it was its
duty to reverse.84 The Court was not content, however, to do this and
no more. Perhaps having in mind the justice of the peace commissions
which gave rise to Marbury v. Madison85 and feeling that no set of facts
is too trivial to provide the vehicle for expounding a judicial doctrine,
it elected in this typical police court case to state, by way of dicta,
its views regarding military due process. Since these views are the
focal point of this discussion it is appropriate to set them forth at
length.
"There are certain standards in the military accusatorial system which

have been specifically set by Congress and which we must demand be ob81.
82.
83.
84.

See Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23, 25 L. Ed. 538 (1879).
United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CMR 74 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
Ibid.
50 U.S.C.A. § 646 (1951).

85. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (U.S. 1803).
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served in the trials of military offenses. Some of these are more important
than others, but all are of sufficient importance to be a significant part of
military law. We conceive these rights to mold into a pattern similar to
that developed in Federal civilian cases. For lack of a more descriptive
phrase, we label the pattern as 'military due process' and then point up
the minimum standards which are the framework for this concept and
which must be met before the accused can be legally convicted. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, supra, contemplates that he be given a fair
trial and it commands us to see that the proceedings in the courts below
reach that standard.
"Generally speaking, due process means a course of legal proceedings
according to those rules and principles which have been established in our
system of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private
rights. For our purposes, and in keeping with the principles of military
justice developed over the years, we do not bottom those rights and privileges on the Constitution. We base them on the laws as enacted by Congress. But, this does not mean that we can not give the same legal effect
to the rights granted by Congress to military personnel as do civilian
courts to those granted to civilians by the Constitution or by other Federal
Statutes.
"A cursory inspection of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, supra,
discloses that Congress granted to an accused the following rights which
parallel those accorded to defendants in civilian courts; to be informed of
the charges against him; to be confronted by witnesses testifying against
him; to cross-examine witnesses for the Government; to challenge members
of the court for cause or peremptorily; to have a specified number of members compose general and special courts-martial; to be represented by
counsel; not to be compelled to incriminate himself; to have involuntary
confessions excluded from consideration; to have the court instructed on
the elements of the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof; to be found guilty of an offense only when a designated number
of members concur in a finding to that effect; to be sentenced only when
a certain number of members vote in the affirmative; and to have an
appellate review.
"By mentioning the foregoing rights and benefits, we have not intended
to make the list all-inclusive, nor to imply others might not be substantial.
We have merely enumerated those which are of such importance as to be
readily catalogued in that category. In addition, we disclaim any intent to
classify these as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. Under our powers as
an appellate court we can reverse for errors of law which materially
prejudice the substantial rights of the accused, and we need go no further
than to hold that the failure to afford to an accused any of the enumerated
rights denied him military due process and furnishes grounds for us to set
aside the conviction.
"Previously adjudicated Federal court cases are a source from which we
can test the prejudicial effect of denying an accused the rights we have set
out as our pattern of 'military due process.'
"True, we need not concern ourselves with the constitutional concepts,
but if the denial of these benefits to a defendant is of sufficient importance
to justify a civilian court in holding that it denied him due process, it
should be apparent to a casual reader that denial of a similar right granted
by Congress to an accussed in the military service constitutes a violation
of military due process. By adopting these principles we impose upon
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military courts the duty of jealously safeguarding those rights which Congress has decreed are an integral part of military due process.
"Aside from the constitutional due process concept threading its way
through Federal cases, we find Federal appellate courts passing directly
on the prejudicial error of failure of trial judges properly to instruct a
jury.
"It was for Congress to set the rules governing military tials. It legislated on the subject and not without adequate consideration. We are not
concerned with the wisdom of the enactment, but we might suggest that
there are many reasons which may have prompted Congress to demand that
instructions be given to members of courts-martial ...
"We cannot better set out reasons why the error materially prejudiced
the substantial rights of the accused than did Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
the case of Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 297. Speaking for the Court,
he stated (pp. 293-294):
"'A subsidiary question remains for determination. It derives from the
Act of February 26, 1919, 40 Stat. 1181, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 391, whereby appellate courts are under duty in criminal as well as civil cases to disregard
'technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.' Is the disregard of the right which Congress gave to
Bruno an error, the commission of which we may disregard? We hold not.
It would be idle to predetermine the scope of such remedial provision as
Sec. 391 by anticipating the myriad varieties of rulings made in trials and
attempting an abstract, inclusive definition of 'technical errors.' Suffice it
to indicate, what every student of the history behind the Act of February
26, 1919, knows, that that Act was intended to prevent matters concerned
with the mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minutiae of
procedure from touching the merits of a verdict. Of a very different order
of importance is the right of an accused to insist on a privilege which
Congress has given him.'
"What we have previously stated goes with like effect to the failure of
the court to instruct on the presumption of innocence and the burden of
proof. We are not impressed with the argument made by the board of
review that it was clothed with authority to determine the sufficiency of
the evidence and that it found the failure to instruct was not prejudicial
because the evidence overcame the presumptions of innocence; that the
elements were established beyond a reasonable doubt; and that it was
satisfied the court or the board of review could not have made a finding
other than that of guilty. Assuming without deciding that the evidence
compels such a finding, we are, nevertheless, required to hold the error
materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused, for the reason
that we can not say one of the historic cornerstones of our s~rstem of civil
jurisprudence is merely a formality of military procedure. If Congress
specifically grants what it considers to be a substantial right, we cannot
deny the authoritative requirement by refusing to recognize it....
"In applying the concepts we have discussed to this case we find the
trial of the accused far short of what is deemed essential to military justice.
In the final analysis, the record as a whole convinces us that the accused
was denied those necessary elements of military due process by which
86
Congress sough to protect him."
86. United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CMR 74, 77-82 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951)
(italics added).
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A moment's reflection discloses that, by its own analysis, the due
process of which the Court speaks is not that of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment nor is it constitutional due process at all.
Rather, it derives solely from the laws enacted by Congress and all of
its component requisites are to be found by an inspection of the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The absence of one
or more of these components is not necessarily jurisdictional and such
absence can be adequately dealt with by the Court exercising its
power to reverse for errors of law which materially prejudice the
substantial rights of the accused. The Court relies on the quotation
from the Bruno case87 in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter was concerned
with the difference between technical error and prejudicial error and
not at all with due process. From the Clay opinion there emerges our
old friend, prejudicial error. Significantly, whereas Congress, in fashioning the Uniform Code of Military Justice, did not once use the words
"due process" it most emphatically did say in Article 59 (a) "A finding
or sentence ... shall not be held incorrect . . . unless the error materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused."
The next appearance of the term due process was again in the roll
of dictum. In the Davis case,88 tried before the effective date of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, none of the counsel were members
of the bar and the record contained no affirmative statement that no
officers so qualified were available. The Court rejected the contention
that the absence of such a statement was fatal error, resting its decision
on Hiatt v. Brown89 and Whelchel v. McDonald,90 two Supreme Court
habeas corpus cases which had squarely held that the absence of an
affirmative showing of nonavailability presented no jurisdictional defect. The Court of Military Appeals said:
"It is recognized, of course, that the Federal authorities referred to in
foregoing paragraphs were concerned with questions of jurisdiction, while
we are not limited to review of this nature. It is certainly true in the
present case that, without holding the court-martial to have been without
jurisdiction to try Davis, it is legally and logically open to us to conclude
that the failure of the record to reflect affirmatively the unavailability of
lawyers under Article of War 11, 10 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1482, is reversible
error. However, we are unwilling to do this."91
Having thus disposed of the only issue raised by the case, one which
can no longer arise under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the
87. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 293, 294, 60 Sup. Ct. 198, 84 L. Ed.
257 (1939).
88. United States v. Davis (No. 29), 2 CMR 8 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
89. 339 U.S. 103, 70 Sup. Ct. 495, 94 L. Ed. 691, rehearing denied, 339 U.S.
939 (1950).
90. 340 U.S. 122 at 126; 71 Sup. Ct. 146, 95 L. Ed. 141 (1950).
91. United States v. Davis (No. 29), 2 CMR 8, 13 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
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Court, apparently by way of afterthought, in the last paragraph of
its opinion declared:
"Apart from the matters dealt with in preceding paragraphs, it should
be said that we find no substantial evidence of neglect of the interests of
the accused by defense counsel -much less that arising to the level of a
denial of due process. Indeed, appellant's case has been presented to us
solely on the basis of the general considerations discussed, and no slightest
suggestion of specific neglect has been made." 92
Under these circumstances this casual use of the term adds little to

the literature of due process.
The third dictum use of the term military due process was in the
Carter case in which trial counsel had read to the court-martial detailed information concerning two previous convictions of the accused
without ever placing this data in evidence. In reversing, the Court
used this language:
"The question of prejudice can be disposed of with little comment. If,
as we hold, the accused neither waived his right to assign insufficiency of

the evidence as error, nor stipulated that the statement made by trial coun-

sel could be considered as evidence of the previous convictions, then it
follows that the sentence exceeds the limits permitted by the Manual. That
an excessive sentence is prejudicial is apparent.
"Our attention has been called to several service cases which have di-

rectly or indirectly considered this question. Without reviewing them in
detail, we believe the rationale expressed in the case of United States v.
Arizona (ACM S-1681), 1 CMR .

, of October 5, 1951, is more con-

93
sistent with our views of military due process and trial procedure."

Here the court found prejudicial error and proceeded to speak of
military due process as roughly synonymous to proper trial procedure.
The finding of prejudicial error alone had fully disposed of the case.
In the Bartholomew case 94 tried under the 1948 Articles of War, the
Court affirmed a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. The principal
ground upon which reversal was urged was that while neither counsel
was a lawyer the trial judge advocate held a law degree and defense
counsel had no formal legal training. In disposing of this contention
the Court declared:
"A clear violation of the express terms of Article of War 11 would certainly raise serious questions of military due process, if not of jurisdiction.
Cf. United States v. Clay,
-USCMA, decided November
27, 1951; United States v. Berry, USCMA, decided March
18, 1952; United States v. Bound,
.USCMA
.. , decided March
13, 1952; United States v. Lee,
.USCMA...
, decided March
92. Id. at 14.

93. United States v. Carter (No. 159), 2 CMR 14, 20 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).

94. United States v. Bartholomew (No. 166), 3 CMR 41 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
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13, 1952. We have, however, been reminded that 'courts sit as well to
convict the guilty as to acquit the innocent, and complaint alone, without
a showing that a fair trial has been denied, will not support a reversal.'
Couchois v. United States, 142 F. 2d 1, 2 (C.A. 5th Cir.). Congress has implicitly recognized, through the Article of War so frequently cited herein,
that an accused person may obtain adequate representation by a nonlawyer. Indeed, line officers have long been permitted to defend such
persons before military courts-martial. This background is persuasive
that prejudice cannot be inferred solely from the fact that the prosecutor
was legally trained, whereas defense counsel was not. In view of these
factors, and recalling that we find here at least a literal and technical
compliance with the command of Congress, it is appropriate that we should
scan the record to determine whether the accused's want of legally-trained
counsel materially prejudiced him in this case....
"After a painstaking search of the entire record, we find nothing whatever which would indicate that the accused was not accorded full, fair,
and competent representationby his counsel. This being the case we can
not at all say that he was materially prejudiced in any substantial right."95
Once more the reference to military due process is pure dictum. Again
the Court based its decision on the absence of material prejudice and
inferred that before there can be a want of military due process there
must be a finding of prejudicial error.
The Welch case, the latest to evoke military due process language,
was one in which the accused, a lieutenant, was convicted under Article
of War 95 of cheating on an examination. In reversing, the majority
opinion of the Court contained this statement:
"At the outset of the investigation, the officer conducting it did not
fully advise petitioner of his rights under Article of War 24, supra. This
was a clear violation of that Article. Nor did he advise petitioner of the
nature of the investigation, or of the charges against him. This officer then
conducted a searching and inquisitorial examination, utilizing all the devices of an expert prosecutor cross-examining a hostile witness, accompanied by shouting, accusations of falsehood, reprimands, and castigations
of character. All these factors inevitably lead to the conclusion that petitioner was, in effect, compelled to incriminate himself. This smacks too
much of Star Chamber proceedings. Petitioner did not have a free choice
to admit or deny his guilt or to refuse to answer the questions asked.
"It follows automatically that the testimony given at this investigation
should not have been received in evidence at the trial. Article of War
24, supra,and Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 602, so command. Further, it matters not that there may be other
evidence of guilt. The right here violated flows, through Congressional
enactment, from the Constitution of the United States. Military due process
requires that courts-martial be conducted not in violation of these consti-'
tutional safeguards which Congress has seen fit to accord to members of
the Armed Forces, United States v. Clay,
USCLA
.
, decided
November 27, 1951. These safeguards are for the protection of all who are
brought within the military disciplinary system, and are not to be disre95. Id. at 45.
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garded merely in order to inflict punishment on one who is believed to be
guilty."96

The majority here indicated that so far as military justice is concerned constitutional benefits are switched on and off by the legislative
action of Congress. Technically, this differs from the position taken
by the Court in the Clay opinion that military due process derives not
at all from the Constitution but solely from Congress. Practically the
result is the same under either concept since without the affirmative
action of Congress no right exists. Judge Latimer, who authored the
extended discussion of due process in Clay felt it necessary in Welch
to file a separate concurring opinion setting forth reservations. He
said:
"I concur in the result. I do not concur outright because I have certain
reservations concerning some of the concepts developed in the Court's
opinion and, therefore, prefer to base my reversal on different grounds....
"... the provisions of both the Articles of War and the paragraph from
Accordingly, the ruling of the law
the Manual ... were violated ....

member in admitting the statement in evidence was error as a matter
of law. This, then, poses the question of whether the error was prejudical....

"One fundamental difference between civilian practice and military
practice which is of importance in this instance is that in the former the
jury does not ordinarily sentence the defendant, while in the military
system the members of the court-martial do. In testing prejudice in military tribunals consideration must be given to the probable impact on
the minds of the members of the court both as to the findings and the
sentence; and if the error itself substantially influenced the court, or if
there is grave doubt as to its prejudicial effect, the findings and sentence
should not be permitted to stand....
"Keeping in mind the considerations mentioned, there are at least
three ways in which I believe the inadmissible evidence prejudiced the
accused .... 97

Thus Judge Latimer expressly found a violation of the rights of the
accused under Article of War 24, as indeed did the majority, that this
error was prejudicial, and rested the reversal on prejudicial error and
not at all on lack of due process.
To the date of writing the only other reference to due process by

the Court was in the Lucas case 98 where its task in hand was a definition of the "substantial rights" of the accused, which if materially
prejudiced necessitate reversal under Article 59 (a). There the Court
quoted from Section 87(c) of the Manual for Courts-Martial 1951:
96. United States v. Welch (No. 196), 3 CMR 136, 142 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
97. United States v. Welch (No. 196), 3 CMR 136, 138 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
98. United States v. Lucas (No. 7), 1 CMR 19 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
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"The test to be applied in determining whether an error materially
prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused is this: An error prejudicial to the rights of the accused must be held to require the disapproval
of a finding of guilty of an offense, or the part thereof, to which it relates
unless the competent evidence of record is of such quantity and quality
that a court of reasonable and conscientious men would have made the
same finding had the error not been committed.
"Regardless, however, of the test in the subparagraph above, if the error
is such a flagrant violation of a fundamental right of the accused as to
amount to a denial of due process (e.g., when the disloyalty of defense
counsel directly aids the prosecution) the finding must be disapproved
regardless of the compelling nature of the competent evidence of record." 99
It will be remembered that in the Lucas case not only did the Court not
pursue due process, but, in view of the plea of guilty of the accused,
found that no prejudicial error existed, reversed the board of review
and affirmed the court-martial conviction. It is significant that the only
mention of due process in the Manual for Courts-Martialis contained
in a discussion of materially prejudical error. In passing it might be
noted that disloyalty of defense counsel, cited as an example of denial
of due process would be an express violation of defense counsel's
oath to perform his duties faithfully as required by Article 42 (a) 100
and would constitute materially prejudicial error.
This examination of these opinions points to the conclusion that
the Court, on those occasions where it employs the term "military
due process" does so interchangeably with, and cumulative to, its application of the test of the presence or absence of "error materially
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused." 10 1

IV.

WHAT MmriARY DuE PRocEss Is NoT

A.
First of all the concept of military process, and even the concatenation of the words themselves, is not new. Currently there is some
slight tendency to think that military justice originated on May
31, 1951, the effective date of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 102
Such was not the case. British Articles of War reach back to the time
99. Id. at 23.
100. 50 U.S.C.A. § 617 (1951).
101. This conclusion is supported by United States v. Hunter (No. 359), 17
Oct. 1952 (U.S.C.M.A.), in which the Court affirmed a death sentence murder
case. In disallowing an appellate contention that the legal representation afforded accused at his trial lacked the quality necessary to insure a fair trial,
the Court, at page four of the advance sheet, said: 'We believe the requirements of the applicable provisions of the Code and Manual, and of military due
process were fully met. Those require that accused be afforded the help and
guidance of military counsel with certain specified qualifications or of counsel
of his own choice. Here he had both." This statement, with the words "and of
military due process" deleted, correctly declares the applicable law.
102. 50 U.S.C.A., note preceding § 551 (1951).
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of Glanvil and antedate Magna Charta itself by some twenty-five
years. 103 If by military due process we mean procedural safeguards for
the fundamental rights of the accused, this was a matter of concern 1in
04
the Articles issued in 1621 by King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden,
in 1672 by Prince Rupert,10 5 in 1686106 and in 1688107 in the English
Military Disciplines of James II, and by Parliament in the Mutiny Act
of 1689.108 Procedural protection was given the accused in Articles
adopted by the Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay on April
5, 1775,109 and by those adopted by the Second Continental Congress
on June 30, 1775.110 George Washington was a member of the legislative
103. Ordinance of Richard I, 1190, issued to prevent disputes between the

soldiers and sailors in their voyage to the Holy Land. Reprinted in 2 WInTnROP, MILITARY LAW, Appendix 3 (1886).
104. Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW, Appendix 8-23 (1886).

Illustrative is: "144. All these Judges both of higher and lower Courts, shall
under the blue Skies thus sweare before Almighty God that they will inviolably
keep this following oath unto us: I. R.W. doe here promise before God upon
his holy Gospell, that I both will and shall judge uprightly in all things according to the lawes of God: of our Nation, and these Articles of Warre, so
farre forth as it pleaseth Almighty God to give me understanding; neither
will I for favour nor for hatred, for good will, feare, ill will, anger, or any
gift or bribe whatsoever, judge wrongfully, but judge him free that ought to
be free, and doom him guilty, that I finde guilty: as the Lord of Heaven and
Earth shall help my soule and body at the last day, I shall hold this oath truly."
105. Reprinted in DAvIs, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, Appendix A, 567-80 (3d ed. 1915). The 74th and last Article thereof
reads: "Whatever is to be published, or generally made known, shall be done
by beat of drum or the sound of trumpet, that so no man may pretend ignorance thereof.

"And after that whoever shall be found disobedient, or faulty, against what
is thus published shall be punish'd according to these Articles, or the quality
of the fact."

106. Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW, Appendix 24-25 (1886). The
following is a typical excerpt: "If the Council of War, or Court-martial be held
to judge a Criminal, the President and Captains having taken their places,

and the prisoner being brought before them. And the Informations read, the
President Interrogates the Prisoner about all the Facts whereof he is accused,
and having heard his Defence, and the Proof made or alleged against him, He
is ordered to withdraw, being remitted to the care of the Marshal or Jaylor.
Then every one judges according to his Conscience, and the Ordnances of the

Articles of War. The Sentence is framed according to the Plurality of Votes,
and the Criminal being brought in again, The Sentence is Pronounced to him
in the name of the Council of War, or Court-Martial."
107. Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW, Appendix 26-37 (1886),
Article LXI thereof provides: "If any Person be committed by the Provost

Martial's own Authority without other Command, he shall acquaint the General
or other Chief Commander with the Cause within twenty-four hours, and the

Provost-Martial shall thereupon dismiss him unless he have Order to the

Contrary."

108. Statutes of the Realm 55, 1 W. & M., c. 5, Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP,
IITARY LAW, Appendix 38-39 (1886). Paragraph 10 directs: "And noe
Sentence of Death shall be given against any offender in such case by any
Court Martiall unless nine of thirteene Officers present shall concur therein.
And if there be a greater number of officers present, then the judgment shall
passe by the concurrence of the greater part of them so sworne, and not otherwise; and noe Proceedings, Tryall or Sentence of Death shall be had or given
against any offender, but betweene the houres of eight in the morning and one
in the afternoone."
109. Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW, Appendix 61-67 (1886).
110. Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, LIT=ARY LAW, Appendix 68-76 (1886).
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committee' and at his suggestion" 2 revisions were made in 1776 by
a congressional committee composed of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson,
John Rutledge, James Wilson and R. R. Livingston." 3 The next year
John Marshall, then a twenty-two year old Captain-Lieutenant of
infantry was appointed "Deputy Judge Advocate in the Army of the
' 4
United States.""
Thus, preconstitutionally, able American legislators
and lawyers gave consideration to a fair system of military justice.
The Constitution itself vested in Congress the power "To make Rules
5
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.""1
In 1857 the United States Supreme Court, after citing the pertinent
constitutional provisions, said:
"These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the
trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then
and now practiced by civilized nations; and that the power to do so is
given without any connection between it and the 3d Article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed, that the two
powers are entirely independent of each other."11 6
Congress has consistently discharged this duty from the very beginning. The first Congress recognized the existing military establishment and provided that it should "be governed by the rules and articles
of war which have been established by the United States in Congress
assembled or by such rules and articles of war as may hereafter by law
be established.""17 Congress adopted new articles of war in- 1806,118
1874,119 1916,120 1920121 and 1948,122 and has repeatedly voted amendments thereto. When in 1950 Congress enacted the Uniform Code of
Military Justice,123 it engaged in no legislative innovation but simply
111. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 21 (2d ed. 1920).
112. DAWs,A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 342 (3d

ed. 1915).

113. WiNTHROP, MILITARY

LAW AND PRECEDENTS

22 (2d ed. 1920). Art. 8 of

§ XIV of these Articles of War of 1776, reprinted at page 968, provided: "No

sentence of a general court-martial shall be put in execution, till after a report
shall be made of the whole proceedings to Congress, or to the general or commander in chief of the forces of the United States, and their or his directions be
signified thereon." Art. 2 of § XVIII, reprinted at page 970, provided: "The
general, or commander in chief for the time being, shall have full power of
pardoning or mitigating any of the punishments ordered to be inflicted, for
any of the offenses mentioned in the foregoing articles; and every offender
convicted as aforesaid, by any regimental court-martial, may be pardoned, or
have his punishment mitigated by the colonel, or officer commanding the regiment."
114. 1 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 119, 138 (1916).
115. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
116. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79, 15 L. Ed. 838 (U.S. 1857).
117. 1 STAT. 95-96 (1789).
118. 2 STAT. 359 (1806).
119. REV.

120.
121.
122.
123.

STAT. § 1342 (1878).
STAT. 650-70 (1916).
STAT. 787 (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 1471-1593a (1946).
62 STAT. 627-44 (1948), 10 U.S.C.A. c. 36 (1950 Supp.).
Act of May 5, 1950, 64 STAT. 108, 50 U.S.C.A. c. 22 (1951).
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discharged a recurring historic constitutional obligation. 124
As we have already noted, 125 as early as 1911 the United States
Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether an Army officer
had been deprived of due process in the manner in which his commission had been terminated. In reversing a writ of mandate issued
by the trial court, and upholding the action taken by military authorities, the Supreme Court said, "To those in the military or naval
service of the United States the military law is due process."'12 The
Supreme Court has twice had occasion to reaffirm this view of due
process as applied to the military in officer elimination cases. 12 7 Furthermore, in the only two military justice cases to reach the Supreme
Court in which it was contended that the accused had been denied due
process and in which such a finding had been made by the United
States Courts of Appeal, 128 the Supreme Court reversed, refused
habeas corpus relief, and found that although extensive error had been
committed there was no denial of due process. 12 9 Thus, consistently,
124. For a discussion of the historical background of military tribunals

see, Wurfel, Military Habeas Corpus, 49 MicH. L. REv. 493-505 (1951).

125. Note 7, infra.
126. Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304, 31 Sup. Ct. 230, 55 L. Ed. 225
(1911).
127. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326, 335, 42 Sup. Ct. 505, 66 L. Ed. 965 (1922),
where the Supreme Court said, "As a Colonel in the Army, the relator was subject to military law and the principles of that law, as provided by Congress,
constituted for him due process of law in a Constitutional sense. Reeves v.
Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304." Also Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336, 3441 42
Sup. Ct. -509, 66 L. Ed. 973 (1922), "Without pursuing the subject further it is

sufficient to repeat what was said by this Court in Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219
U.S. 296, 304: 'To those in the military or naval service of the United States the
military law is due process. The decision, therefore, of a military tribunal acting within the scope of its lawful powers cannot be reviewed or set aside by
the courts.'"
128. Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1948), rev'd sub nom. Humphrey
v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 69 Sup. Ct. 830, 93 L. Ed. 986, rehearing denied, 337 U.S.
934 (1949) ; and Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949), reversed, 339 U.S.
103, 70 Sup. Ct. 495, 94 L. Ed. 691, rehearingdenied, 339 U.S. 939 (1950).
129. In Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 110-11, 70 Sup. Ct. 495, 94 L. Ed. 691
(1950), the Supreme Court explicitly stated: "The Court of Appeals also concluded that certain errors committed by the military tribunal and reviewing
authorities had deprived respondent of due process.
"The following instances of error in the military proceedings were cited by
the Court of Appeals: '(1) Accused was convicted on the theory that although
he was on duty as a sentry at the time of the offense, it was incumbent upon
him to retreat from his post of duty. (2) Accused has been convicted of murder on evidence that does not measure to malice, premeditation, or deliberation.
(3) The record reveals that the law member appointed was grossly incompetent. (4) There was no pre-trial investigation whatever upon the charge of
murder. (5) The record shows that counsel appointed to defend the accused
was incompetent, gave no preparation to the case, and submitted only a token
defense. (6) The appellate reviews by the Army reviewing authorities reveal
a total misconception of the applicable law.' 175 F.2d at 277.
"We think the court was in error in extending its review for the purpose of
determining compliance with the due process clause, to such matters as the
propositions of law set forth in the staff judge advocate's report, the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain respondent's conviction, the adequacy of the pretrial
investigation, and the competence of the law member and defense counsel.
Cf. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949). It is well settled that 'by habeas
corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the
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through the years, the United States Supreme Court has refused to
recognize that there is any such thing as military due process apart
from the acts of Congress declaring what the military law is. Stated
another way, although the concept of military due process is not new,
it has never been subscribed to by the Supreme Court.
As a pertinent parallel it should be observed that the essence of
the provision of Article 59 (a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
that "a finding... shall not be held incorrect ... unless the error [of
law] materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused," is
not new to military law. Article of War 37 of the 1948 Articles in pertinent part provided that "proceedings... shall not be held invalid...
for any error as to any matter of pleading or procedure unless ... it
shall appear that the error... has injuriously affected the substantial
rights of the accused."'130 Its predecessor, Article of War 37 of the 1920
Articles, 131 contained exactly the same language. Thus for over thirty
years Army boards of review have been reversing convictions where
the record disclosed that error "injuriously affected the substantial
rights of the accused." Whether under the present test of "materially
prejudices," more serious error must be found to warrant reversal
than was necessary under the old test of "injuriously affected" is conjectural. As a practical matter the legal result under either yardstick
would probably be substantially the same, and the Court has so
indicated. 13 2
B.
A second thing military due process is not, and hence is to be distinguished from, is jurisdiction. The Court has drawn this distinction.
In the Clay case it said:
".... we disclaim any intent to classify these [rights] as jurisdictional or
nonjurisdictional. Under our powers as an appellate court we can reverse
for errors of law which materially prejudice the substantial rights of the
accused, and we need go no further than to hold that the failure to afford
to an accused any of the enumerated rights denied him military due
process...."133
In the Davis case it stated, 134 "It is recognized . . . the Federal authorities ... were concerned with . . . jurisdiction. While we are not
limited to review of this nature." Finally in the Bartholomew case the
Court, declared,135 "A clear violation of... Article of War 11 would
proceedings of a court-martial.'" The six enumerated errors appeared in the
Court's footnote number 6 at 339 U.S. 110.
130. 41 STAT. 794 (1920).
131. 41 STAT. 794 (1920).
132. United States v. Berry (No. 69), 2 CAR 141, (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
133. United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CAR 74, 78 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
134. United States v. Davis (No. 29), 2 CAR 8, 13 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
135. United States v. Bartholomew (No. 166), 3 CAR 41, 45 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
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certainly raise serious questions of military due process, if not of
jurisdiction." Furthermore, when the Court has been confronted with
real jurisdictional issues it has treated them as such without reference
to due process. 136 This comports with the steadfast refusal of the
Supreme Court to exalt asserted due process violations to the stature
137
of jurisdictional defects in military habeas corpus cases.
C.

Thirdly, military due process is not constitutional due process. The
Court of Military Appeals speaking of due process has said, 138 "we do
not bottom those rights and privileges on the Constitution. We base
them on the laws as enacted by Congress," and further, 13 "we need not
concern ourselves with the constitutional concepts.. . ." This conforms
to the holding of the Supreme Court in Creary v. Weeks 140 that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to military
tribunals.
Nor do the other provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to military
law. The Court of Military Appeals has recognized this in holding
that the Fourth Amendment prohibition "against unreasonable searches
and seizures" does not in the military service require a search warrant,
and does not make unlawful, searches conducted by a military commander or his authorized representatives where there is probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed. 14' This result is quite
different from that reached in civil life under the Fourth Amendment.
136. See Part II E, supra.
137. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 700-01, 69 Sup. Ct. 830, 93 L. Ed. 986
(1949), rehearingdenied, 337 U.S. 934 (1949); and Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103,
110-11, 70 Sup. Ct. 495, 94 L. Ed. 691, rehearingdenied, 339 U.S. 939 (1950).
138. United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CMR 74, 77 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
139. United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CMR 74,79 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
140. 259 U.S. 336, 343, 42 Sup. Ct. 509, 66 L. Ed. 973 (1922). "Thus is presented for decision the question whether the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment required that the relator should be given an opportunity to be
heard before the finding was made by the board which required his discharge

from the Army.
"The power given to Congress by the Constitution to raise and equip armies
and to make regulations for the government of the land and naval forces of
the country (Art. I, Sec. 8) is as plenary and specific as that given for the organization and conduct of civil affairs; military tribunals are as necessary to
secure subordination and discipline in the army as courts are to maintain law
and order in civil life; and the experience of our Government for now more
than a century and a quarter, and of the English Government for a century
or more, proves that a much more expeditious procedure is necessary in mili-

tary than is thought tolerable in civil affairs (2

STAT.

359; Dynes v. Hoover,

20 How. 65). It is difficult to imagine any process of government more distinctively administrative in its nature and less adapted to be dealt with by the
processes of civil courts than the classification and reduction in number of the
officers of the Army, provided for in Sec. 24b. In its nature it belongs to the executive and not to the judicial branch of the Government."
141. United States v. Doyle (No. 265), 4 CMR 137 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952). The
Court at page 141, stated, "[T]he action of the master-at-arms in searching
petitioner's locker was, according to existing military and naval law, reasonable."
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The Supreme Court has held that not only does the Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment, from which "cases arising in
the land or naval forces" are expressly excepted, not apply to military
prosecutions, but that the Sixth Amendment guaranty of the right
to trial by jury is equally inapplicable to military prosecutions, even
though the exception is not there spelled out. It has also held that the
constitutional provision of Article III, Section 2, that, "The trial of
all crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury" has no
application to military tribunal prosecutions. 14 Even more sweepingly
the Supreme Court has said,14 3 "the power of Congress, in the government of the land and naval forces and the militia, is not at all affected
by the fifth or any other amendment."
Citations are unnecessary for the proposition that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, directed at state action, has
no application to the federal instrumentality of military justice.
D.
Military due process, fourthly, is not a totality of error doctrine,
and cannot be brought into play by the cumulation of a number of
nonprejudi~ial errors in a single case. The court of Military Appeals
so held in the Zimmerman case:
"Appellate defense counsel, admitting arguendo that, considered individually, none of the errors listed above prejudiced the accused, argues
that their cumulative effect was such as to warrant a finding of prejudice.
Counsel refers to several Federal cases in support of this proposition.
Without analyzing those decisions in detail, we note that the individual
errors in each of them contained some, although slight, possibility of prejudice. Such is not the case here. The errors discussed above are formal
in nature and we fail to see how, individually or collectively, they could
have in any way materially harmed the accused. Since we find no substantial prejudice, we are bound by Article 59 of the Uniform Code of
MVilitary Justice, 50 USCA Sec. 646, to hold that the errors considered
by the board of review do not require disapproval of the findings and
sentence." 1 44

E.
Finally, military due process does not stem from a segregation of
general prejudice as distinguished from specific prejudical errors. This
differentiation has been undertaken by the Court of Military Appeals
142. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39-45, 63 Sup. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942).

In

317 U.S. at 40 the Supreme Court said, "[W]e must conclude that Sec. 2 of
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury trial by military commission. . .

Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 8, 41 Sup. Ct. 224, 65 L. Ed. 469 (1920).
143. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 138, 18 L. Ed. 281 (U.S. 1866).

."

Also

144. United States v. Zimmerman (No. 261), 2 CMR 66, 68 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
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but in its treatment of general prejudice no reference has been made
to due process.
The development of the doctrine of general prejudice has pursued
a curious course. Judge Brosman first spoke of it in a case in which
the question certified was whether the fact that the accuser later
served as trial counsel divested the court-martial of jurisdiction. The
square holding on this single issue, in the language of the Court, was:
"We have searched the record with care and find no suggestion whatever of specific prejudice- that is, of prejudice operating against the
accused in this particular case.... We find, in short, no shadow of showing
in the record that the accused in this case was or could have been prejudiced by the fact that the interests of the Government therein were
represented by the accuser who had perforce conducted an informal presignature inquiry into its facts....
"... the inquiry conducted by the accuser here did not constitute him
an investigating officer, and thus disqualified him -and we explicity so
145

hold."

Having thus disposed of the case, Judge Brosman then wrote:
"Nor do we find a basis for the belief that what might be described as
general prejudice should be deemed to exist by virtue of the fact that
Lieutenant Barton, the accuser, also served as trial counsel. We are confident that our meaning in the use of this standard will not be misapprehended. Report has already been made of the limitations on the 'harmless
error' formula set up in the Kotteakos case, supra. At this point it should
be said that we are not at all sure that equal caution should not be exercised in the invocation of this otherwise wholesome principle in perhaps
one further setting. We have in mind here a situation in which the error
consists not in a violation of constitutional or legislative provisions, but
involves instead an overt departure from some 'creative and indwelling
principle' - some critical and basic norm operative in the area under
consideration. Such a compelling criterion we find within the sphere of
this Court's effort in the sound content of opposition to command control
of the military judicial process to be derived with assurance from all four
corners of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Is this criterion violated
by permitting the accuser to serve as trial counsel? We think not.
"It has been suggested, however, that departure from a specific requirement of the Manual should, of itself, constitute 'general prejudice'
of the type we are here discussing. We have no doubt that this may be
true in a proper case if, but only if, the policy underlying the Manual
requirement is so overwhelmingly important in the scheme of military
justice as to elevate it to the level of a 'creative and indwelling principle.'
The previous discussion should be persuasive that no such policy consideration exists here."1 46

Thus "general prejudice," like "military due process," was conceived in
dicta. Judge Latimer concurred only in the result,147 based patently
upon a different premise.
145. United States v. Lee (No. 200), 2 CMR 118, 122, 124 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
146. Id. at 123-24.
147. Id. at 124.
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In another case decided the same day, Judge Brosman quoted from
the Lee case and then said:
"Because of the finding of a probability of specific prejudice against the
accused, it is unnecessary that we inquire into the presence of general
prejudice growing out of the membership in the court-matial under the
facts of the instant case [accused pleaded guilty] of one who was an investigating officer within the meaning of paragraph 64, Manual for CourtsFor this reason we express no conclusion on
Martial, United States, 1951.
48
the subject at this time."'
This time the straw man does not even get to assume an upright position before being stricken down, but, general prejudice is nutured
by a dictum.
In the Berry case 149 the accused was tried in Korea on May 4, 1951,
under the procedure established by the 1948 Articles of War. The President of the Court usurped the duties of the law member by ruling on
motions to dismiss a specification, to exclude a confession and for
findings of not guilty, and by advising the accused as to his rights. The
Court addressed itself to the question of whether this error was prejudicial, and Judge Brosman writing the majority opinion said:
"We have recently examined the content of the phrase 'material prejudice''in our opinion in the Lee case, supra. There we enunciated two
approaches to the question of prejudice. The first and more obvious of these
was denominated specific prejudice and described as that to be derived
from the facts and circumstances of the particular case before the court
and either more or less demonstrably operative against the accused
there ....

The second concept we termed general prejudice. This was

characterized as the produce of an 'overt departure from some "creative
and indwelling principle" - some critical and basic norm operative in
the area under consideration.' United States v. Lee, supra. Such a compelling criterion- we there suggested by way of example- is to be found
within the sphere of this Court's efforts in the 'sound content of opposition
to command control of the military judicial process to be derived with
assurance from all four corners of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.'
The complete independence of the law member and his unshackled freedom from direction of any sort or nature are, we entertain no doubt, vital,
integral, even crucial, elements of the legislative effort to minimize opportunity for the exercise of control over the court-martial process by any
agency of command. It follows that any abdication by the law member of
his statutory duties and an attendant usurpation of those functions by the
president- much more directly a representative of the convening authority-must be viewed with stern suspicion. . . ."150
Here, the majority resolutely turned its back upon its tried and true
prejudicial error formula of the specific variety and elected to base
148. United States v. Bound (No. 201), 2 CMR 130, 136 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
149. United States v. Berry (No. 69), 2 CMR 141 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
150. Id. at 146.
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its decision on the general prejudice dicta from the Lee case. Judge
Latimer, concurring in the result only, filed a separate opinion in which
he ably and vigorously espoused, as the basis of decision, common
garden variety prejudicial error. He wrote:
"I agree that the cause should be reversed, but do so on the narrow
ground that the trial before the court-martial was so lacking in the essentials of military judicial procedure that the rights of this accused were
substantially prejudiced. The court's opinion goes much further and
rationalizes on general prejudice, which appears to me unnecessary in this
setting, and contrary to the clear mandate of Congress. It is to reserve
from my concurrence an approval of that concept which leads me to file
this opinion.
"Congress commanded that an accused have questions of law and preliminary questions of fact decided by a law member who possessed certain
qualifications. Here that command was ignored. To say that bypassing
the law member is not prejudicial to the man on trial is to say that any
reviewer of trial or trier of fact can be eliminated without harm to the
individual on trial.
"I believe that when Congress authorized preliminary rulings by a
legally trained person and that right is refused there is involved a prejudicial denial of a right of substance. It is more than a belief that some
over-arching principle of general prejudice permeates the atmosphere
of the court room. It is the refusal to grant to the accused a fundamental
right guaranteed to him by the Articles of War. If we are permitted to
reason by analogy with the civilian practice this, to me, smacks of a judge
allowing the foreman of a jury to decide questions of law and admissibility
of confessions.

. . ."151

The very next day the Court in the Gordon case' 52 held it was prejudicial error for a General whose quarters had been burglarized by
the accused to be the convening authority of a general court-martial
to try even another offense committed by this accused. Judge Brosman
in a separate concurring opinion wrote:
"I concur fully in the result in this case.
"I do not understand Judge Latimer to evaluate the error it contains
as jurisdictional-whatever exactly this term may mean. I do understand
him to have concluded that the substantial rights of the accused were
materially prejudiced. I am sure he is correct in this determination.
Without, however, inquiring whether the record reflects a basis for a
finding of specific prejudice as developed in United States v. Lee,
, decided March 13, 1952, I prefer to bottom my concurUSCMArence on the concept of general prejudice, as applied by this Court in
, decided March 18, 1952.
USCMA
United States v. Berry, , decided March
USCMA
See also United States v. Bound, 13, 1952."153

151. Id. at 148-50.
152. United States v. Gordon (No. 258), 2 CMR 161 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
153. Id. at 168.
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This separate opinion relies on a dictum to reach by a separate route

a result already arrived at by the Court by an application of the wellestablished prejudicial error doctrine.
From these four cases it is apparent that Judge Brosman is the

progenitor of "general prejudice" and that Judge Latimer has refused
to subscribe to it. The congressional mandate is "error materially
prejudicial," without subdivision. It would seem that material prejudice, no matter how thinly sliced, would continue to be material pre-

judice and that multiplying the adjectives in front of prejudice is not
helpful. In none of the cases in which it has been mentioned was it
necessary to a finding of prejudicial error, to resort to the heady elixir
of an "overt departure from some 'creative and indwelling principle' some critical and basic norm operative in the area under consideration." 15 4 Congress is not so esoteric. The prose employed in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice is quite specific, and in a given case, its
provisions either are or are not violated, and where violated, the
resulting error either is or is not materially prejudicial to the accused.
As Judge Latimer has said, the finding of prejudice involves "more
than a belief that some overarching principle of general prejudice
'1 55
permeates the atmosphere of the court room.
In any event it is clear that when the Court speaks of due process
it does not mean general, as distinguished from specific, prejudice, nor
does it have reference to an "overt departure from some 'creative and
indwelling principle'- some critical and basic norm operative in the
area under consideration."
V.

WHAT MnTrrARY

DUE PROCESS PROBABLY IS

"To those in the military or naval service of the United States the
military law is due process."' 56 "The Congress shall have power ...
to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces ....'15 This "power of Congress ... is not at all affected
by the fifth or any other amendment."' 58 "It was for Congress to set the
rules governing military trials."' 59 "[T]he only way by which Congress
can make certain what it deems important is by saying so in its legislative pronouncement.' 60 "[W]e are unable to escape the express mandate from Congress that we should not reverse except for an error
materially prejudicing the substantial rights of the accused.' 61
154. United States v. Lee (No. 200), 2 CMR 118, 123 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
155. United States v. Berry (No. 64), 2 CMR 141, 149 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
156. Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304, 31 Sup. Ct. 230, 55 L. Ed. 225
(1911).
157. U.S. CoNsT. ART. I. § 8, cl. 14.
158. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2, 138, 18 L. Ed. 281 (U.S. 1866).
159. United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 CMR 74, 80 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
160. Ibid.
161. United States v. Lucas (No. 7), 1 CMR 19, 25 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
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Military due process is not jurisdictional, it is not constitutional due
process, it is not violated by a cumulation of nonprejudicial error, it
is not general prejudice and it has not once been mentioned by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. By process of elimination
then, any violation of a provision of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice resulting in error which the Court finds materially prejudiced
the substantial rights of an accused constitutes a want of military due
process. Conversely, any military tribunal action, within its jurisdiction, supported by "some substantial evidence" in which the Court
finds no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused is one complying with military due process.
The formulas of the Court then become, "The case is reversed because of error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused, a failure to comply with military due process," and, "The case
is affirmed because there is no error materially prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused, a compliance with military due
process." It is submitted that the addition of the final clause, in each
case, to the formulas, adds nothing to their thought content. Accordingly, they should be deleted, unless one fully subscribes to the position
taken by Judge Brosman in the O'Neal case that, "Words mean nothing
in themselves; we have no desire to bbg down in a morass of verbalaspect of the matter as of little imism; and we regard the semantic
162
bargain."'
the
into
portance
VI. WHAT TO Do

A~ouT IT

The Court of Military Appeals may make what it will of "military
due process." So long as that Court avoids jurisdictional error adverse
to an accused there is no judicial agency which can review its
opinions. 163 It could, if it chose, say, "We find prejudicial error which
violates the doctrine of 'ex bono et aequo' and therefore reverse." A
court with this practically unlimited power may, in appropriate cases,
exercise the doctrine of self correction, even as does the Supreme Court.
Delicacy dictates discreetly decorous dissent from the use the
Court has made of the words military due process. The writer would
not go quite so far as did the Court when in speaking of res gestae it
characterized it as "the bastard and unhelpful catchphrase res gestae of
nebulous meaning .... "

164

Without casting aspersions upon the vener-

able ancestry of the words military due process, they may be aptly
characterized as "the ...

unhelpful catchphrase military due process

of nebulous meaning." If they have a separate significance the Court
162. United States v. O'Neal (No. 25), 2 CMR 44, 49 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
163. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111, 70 Sup. Ct. 495, 94 L. Ed. 691, rehearing
denied, 339 U.S. 939 (1950).
164. United States v. Mounts (No. 73), 2 CMR 20, 24 (U.S.C.M.A. 1952).
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has not removed their nebulosity and this should be done. If they are
simply another way of saying "no prejudicial error" they are tautological and should be excised.
It is hoped the Court will work out the destiny of military justice
within the prescribed Uniform Code framework by continuing the very
fine start it has made in applying to each case the congressionally
imposed test of the presence or absence of error materially prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused. This places the Court in no
strait jacket. Rather it permits the Court to engage in each case in
unlimited inquiry and in painstaking analysis as it has so ably done
in the many cases in which it has applied the prejudicial error rule
during the first year of its work. In the course of time the Court of
Military Appeals will, in the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, "prick...
out by the gradual approach and contact of decisions on the opposing
sides" 16 the lines delimiting the boundaries of prejudicial error.
165. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. Ed. 112
(1911).

